My Letter Of Support To Former PM Paul Keating On Australia's China Policy, Copied To The Government

Former Australian PM Paul Keating created quite a stir recently when he criticised the Australian press for neglecting its professional duty and acting as a mouthpiece for the pro-US and anti-China establishment.

He got a bit of pushback from the affected parties for his remarks.

A few days later, I saw a tweet that solicited messages of support from Australians who agreed with Mr Keating, and the tweet also encouraged respondents to copy Prime Minister Anthony Albanese.

I decided it was best to stand up and make my voice heard, so I sent out the following email, copying both PM Albanese and Foreign Minister Penny Wong:

Subject: I support Paul Keating's stance on Australian policy re. China

To: susan.grusovin@aph.gov.au

CC: A.Albanese.MP@aph.gov.au, senator.wong@aph.gov.au (The copy to Albanese bounced, since he seems to have discontinued the use of this address, but Penny Wong's office acknowledged receipt of my mail.)

Hi,

As an Australian citizen and voter, I want to make my opinion clear (hence copying the PM and FM) that I am alarmed about my country being frogmarched into a coming proxy war being orchestrated by the United States against China.

1. China is not a threat to Australia. It is our largest trading partner. The Australian and Chinese economies are complementary, and Australia will continue to grow and prosper if we maintain cordial relations with China.

2. Any talk of Chinese invasion is rubbish. Not only does China not need to physically invade Australia when it can acquire Australian resources through trade at significantly lower cost, it is also logistically infeasible. This argument by the anti-China lobby is deliberately emotive but groundless.

3. All talk by the US of freedom, democracy and human rights is well-known to be selective and used for geopolitical reasons only. The US has never criticised Israel or Saudi Arabia for their appalling human rights records because they are allies. (Now that Saudi Arabia has defied the US by signing a deal with Iran under China's auspices, I expect its human rights record will be taken up by the US in a predictable manner.) Besides, when even the Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC) has not complained about China's treatment of Uyghur Muslims, why is the West (which waged two decades of war against Muslim countries and killed millions of people in the War on Terror) so concerned about Muslims in China? It is apparent that the Uyghur Muslim issue is not a real one but just a handy stick to beat China with. Why is the treatment of Muslims by the Hindu right-wing government of India not mentioned by the same people who seem so concerned about the Uyghurs? Probably because India is considered an ally for now.

4. The US is only interested in preserving its hegemony, nothing else. It has no allies, only useful vassal states that it uses in proxy wars. If we are a truly sovereign nation, our foreign policy should be aimed at securing the interests of the Australian people, not at furthering the interests of the US.

5. We have seen how devastatingly Ukraine has been wrecked in the US's proxy war against Russia. Regardless of the moral posturing over Russia's "unprovoked aggression" (yeah, right), we know that the US has been deliberately stoking this conflict for years, and it became blatantly obvious with the 2014 Victoria Nuland-orchestrated coup that deposed a democratically elected Ukrainian government and installed successive puppet regimes. An elected Australian government has a sacred responsibility to ensure that Australia does not suffer a similar fate as Ukraine. We have this dire example before us, and cannot feign ignorance of the fate that awaits a US proxy.

6. It is alarming in the extreme to see the orchestrated establishment and media campaign reaching a crescendo on China. The US is stoking a conflict with China over Taiwan, engaging in deliberately provocative actions when it officially has a One-China Policy that only recognises the PRC. Not only is the sudden interest in Taiwan unwarranted, the prepping of Australia and Japan towards greater militarisation should ring alarm bells. If a war breaks out, it will be Australia and Japan that will do the actual fighting as US proxies. The US will not put boots on the ground. It will supply arms (on a strictly lend-lease basis, of course, which will keep our children and grandchildren in debt), but it will be Australian and Japanese soldiers who will actually lay down their lives.

7. Although we keep repeating the phrase "Lest we forget" when we talk about Gallipoli, it's clear that we have never learnt the basic lesson from that tragic episode - that Australia should stop fighting other countries' wars.

8. The Scott Morrison government was extremely irresponsible in destroying a hitherto harmonious relationship with China with ill-considered and unnecessary calls for a hostile investigation into the origins of Covid. The fallout in the form of Chinese trade sanctions on Australian goods, though costly to our citizens, was only economic. The Albanese government initially seemed to be repairing that damage and resetting relations with China, but recent actions have lurched in the opposite direction, and will drag us beyond a mere economic rift to actual military conflict.

9. The nuclear element of the AUKUS deal is particularly alarming. In the event of hostilities with China (which is what the war hawks are clamouring for), our government would have made Australia a target for a nuclear attack by escalating our military capability to a nuclear level. It is a shockingly irresponsible thing for a government to do.

10. Spending $368 billion of taxpayer money on this irresponsibly dangerous initiative is not just a waste. It is going to be funded through massive cuts to welfare, healthcare, education, infrastructure and other areas of the economy that require committed government support. This fiscal irresponsibility is shocking too.

11. There is much talk of Australian politics being illegally influenced by Chinese government interests (as with the Sam Dastyari episode), but the fact is that American influence on Australian politics is far, far greater, yet unremarked upon. The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) is being given carte blanche to conduct its lobbying activities out in the open, when its chief sponsor is known to be the US arms industry. This organisation must be shut down, its foreign employees deported and its Australian employees investigated for crimes no less than treason. The interests of Australia and its citizens are not just being ignored but actively jeopardised in favour of those of a foreign country. This is a treasonable offence.

In sum, as a citizen, I am horrified that an elected government has so dramatically turned its back on the interests of its own people and succumbed to the pressure of a fading superpower that wants to use us as cannon fodder to maintain its hegemony. I am not privy to the threats the US must have used to get our government to comply, but they are no excuse for this egregious betrayal.

On a personal note, I am of Indian origin, not Chinese, and therefore my views cannot be dismissed as being motivated by cultural affinity towards China.

The government needs to know that its recent steps with regard to China are causing extreme alarm among its voting citizens, and there will be political repercussions if it does not reverse course immediately.

Ganesh Prasad

A Creative Solution To The India-China Border Row

I've read a great deal about the roots of the India-China border conflict - quite a few online articles, and three books in particular.

1. India After Gandhi, by Ramachandra Guha
2. India versus China (Why They Are Not Friends), by Kanti Bajpai
3. Powershift, by Zorawar Daulet Singh

Another important book is "India's China War" by Neville Maxwell, which is based on the yet-unreleased Henderson-Brooks Report (HBR). I have read excerpts of this book.

In a nutshell, the situation is complex, nuanced and characterised by misunderstandings and missteps by both sides. There are tensions between principles and interests, and between realpolitik and the pressures of democracy (on the Indian side). We will see the interplay between these aspects as we analyse the issue.

The root of the conflict

The root of the conflict is Tibet.

China's 1949 takeover of Tibet, which was hitherto a buffer state between India and China, suddenly created a border between the latter two countries. This is the border that then had to be negotiated.

The fundamental issue of principle is whether China had a right to annex Tibet in the first place. We can debate this endlessly based on history, and also based on whataboutism regarding India's 1973 annexation of Sikkim, another Himalayan kingdom. However, the real opposing point to principle here is realpolitik. Nobody today seriously disputes China's claim to Tibet. It is a part of the "One China" concept that all countries, including the US and India, have accepted.

Do we continue debating the annexation of Tibet by China on principle, or do we adopt an attitude of realpolitik and move on? (I would say move on.)

Ownership of Aksai Chin

Aksai Chin is a desolate and barren area of the Himalayas, cold, arid and unsuitable for agriculture, uninhabitable, and not known for any significant mineral resources. With the annexation of Tibet, however, Aksai Chin gained enormous strategic importance for China, because it provided the only access route into Tibet from China, specifically from China's Xinjiang province.

Since this was an area that was uninhabited and not actively patrolled by India, India remained unaware that China had started construction of a road in 1950 called the Karakoram Highway. China did it quietly and without fanfare. India only came to know about it in 1957, when a Chinese publication mentioned it publicly for the first time. Then all hell broke loose in India.

Given that Aksai Chin was a remote and inaccessible area, Jawaharlal Nehru was initially inclined to let Aksai Chin go, even arguing at one stage that "not a blade of grass grows there". However, he changed his mind when one of his advisors showed him documents establishing India's strong claim to the region.

From India's perspective, Aksai Chin was indisputably Indian territory, and there was no negotiation possible. It was an issue of principle. From China's perspective, it was a question of interests. The Karakoram Highway (and therefore Aksai Chin through which it passed) were of vital strategic importance, because there was no other way to access Tibet from China. Although China today has built other access routes into Tibet (including high-speed rail links) and thereby reduced its strategic dependence on the Karakoram highway, Aksai Chin was something China could not afford to give up back in those days. By analogy, the narrow Siliguri Corridor that connects India's northeastern states to the rest of India is a strategically important piece of territory. Even if another country (say Bangladesh) were to produce strong documentary evidence proving their claim to the Siliguri Corridor, India simply couldn't afford to give it up. That was China's situation in the 1950s and 1960s. India had the legal claim to Aksai Chin, but China could simply not afford to give it up.

Pedants would point out that the strategic importance of Aksai Chin to China was only because of the annexation of Tibet, which was itself questionable. However, if we accept the international consensus today that Tibet belongs to China, then it follows that China could not afford to give up Aksai Chin for reasons of national interest. Hence the tension between principle and national interest.

Negotiating positions

When China negotiated with India on Aksai Chin, India's position was unyielding for two reasons.

1. Nehru was recently convinced of India's legal claim to Aksai Chin, and therefore was indignant that China just moved into the area without even asking for permission or notifying India;
2. Even if Nehru had been willing to yield Aksai Chin to China after understanding China's crucial interest in it, the issue had by then become public knowledge in India. India's opposition parties, the press and public opinion together ensured that the Indian government could not yield on Aksai Chin.

We can see the tension between principle and national interest, and also between realpolitik and public pressure.

Bargaining chips

China realised that India was not going to budge on its claim to Aksai Chin, yet was unable to give up a vitally important piece of territory in view of its need to access Tibet.

I wonder if China could have offered to buy the territory from India. It might have been a fair way to settle the issue. Yet what China did in practice was introduce a new bargaining chip.

China did not have a strategic interest in territory to the east, but saw the opportunity to make a claim there to balance India's claim to Aksai Chin. China laid claim to the North East Frontier Area (NEFA), called Arunachal Pradesh today, on the grounds that it formed a contiguous part of Tibet. There was a plausible basis for the claim because the Tawang region of Arunachal Pradesh does in fact host monasteries that are an extension of a line of such monasteries in Tibet. China offered to relinquish its claim to NEFA if India would cede Aksai Chin.

The Indian government was understandably indignant about the new Chinese claim. It was clear that China, being unable to prove a superior legal claim to Aksai Chin, and faced with an India that was unwilling (or unable thanks to public pressure) to cede territory that was vitally important to China, was now staking a new claim just as a bargaining chip. Once again, we can see a tension between various elements. There's a matter of principle involved, because there is a justification for at least the Tawang area of Arunachal Pradesh to be reunited with the rest of Tibet, since the two are culturally contiguous. But then principle would also exhume the question of China's claim to Tibet itself. A third matter of principle is that one cannot accept a swap based on a new claim that was made with the transparent goal of balancing a valid claim by the other side. The opposing element of realpolitik says a swap between Aksai Chin (which India has a stronger claim to but China has a greater need for) and Arunachal/Tawang (which China/Tibet has a greater claim to but not a great need for) is a reasonable way forward. But then the indignation of the Indian government over this deliberately created bargaining chip, compounded by public pressure, meant that the swap could not be agreed to. As Nehru commented at the time, "If I agree to this deal, I will cease to be prime minister tomorrow".

The effect of time

China has been offering the "swap deal" (Aksai Chin for Arunachal Pradesh) on multiple occasions to several Indian governments, and has been rebuffed each time.

But over the years, as the power gap between India and China has widened in China's favour, realpolitik has begun to make India see that the swap deal was in fact a good idea to settle the border dispute for good, because India cannot afford to have an increasingly powerful adversary on its borders.

Unfortunately for India, it appears that that boat has sailed. In view of the growing power differential, the border tussle has now become one-sided in that China holds the initiative. China can keep India off-balance on the border, and India is forced into a reactive stance. The border dispute has now become a source of leverage for China over India. Every time India does something to displease China, China just has to "yank the chain" on the border to convey its displeasure. In this situation, settling the border dispute means China gives up that leverage. From China's perspective, why should it?

The new bargain

China now sees a settlement of the border dispute as a gift that it is giving India, because it means irreversibly relinquishing a source of leverage. Once the border is settled, China cannot make fresh territorial claims on India, which is a matter of great relief to India. However, there is no corresponding constraint on India's side. India can continue to engage in behaviour that displeases or threatens China, such as allying with China's enemies. Hence China needs something irreversible from India in exchange.

The basis for a bargain has therefore now altered. The swap is no longer the old one (Aksai Chin in exchange for Arunachal). The new swap is at a higher level (the border settlement itself in exchange for something irreversible from India).

The opportunity

The crisis in Ukraine has brought matters to a head. The rift between the West and Russia has become serious. China knows that its greatest threat is from the US-led West, and therefore it needs to align with Russia, but it lacks the leverage to do so openly, both because such open alignment violates its own stated policies, and because it is not immune to Western sanctions and related economic pressure.

India is in a similar bind. There are issues of national interest in supporting Russia. Yet there are dangers in doing so openly. And there is the further issue that India sees China as an adversary and the West as a necessary ally against China. The Russia-India-China triangle is complicated, with unresolved tensions. All three countries have an interest in seeing this tension resolved.

A possible solution

If India takes the initiative, it will need to accept the swap deal to settle the border dispute with China, and offer something irreversible in exchange. That something irreversible could be a package:

1. A similar settlement of the India-Pakistan border dispute, formalising the Line of Control (LOC) as the international border, making Pakistan-administered Kashmir no longer disputed territory, and hence removing India's opposition to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, which passes through Pakistan-administered Kashmir;
2. An agreement to withdraw from the Quad and other anti-China groupings;
3. An offer to link India's transport and port network to China's BRI to provide China better access to the Indian Ocean.

If China takes the initiative, it can make India an offer that it cannot refuse. The official Indian negotiating position is still that China needs to return Aksai Chin as well as relinquish its claim to Arunachal Pradesh. Realpolitik recognises that this is unlikely to happen, and a swap deal (Aksai Chin for Arunachal) is the best that India can hope for.

However, there is an opportunity here, because what the two countries need from Aksai Chin are different! India wants recognition of title. China wants operational control (perhaps less critically today than in the 1950s and 1960s). So a package from China could look like this:

1. China recognises Aksai Chin as part of India, on the condition that India leases it back to China for (say) 99 years. Indian public opinion can be assuaged by the fact that Aksai Chin has been returned (in terms of legal title), yet China retains operational control of the territory, which changes nothing on the ground. The financial terms of the lease may be pocket change for China.
2. China relinquishes its claim to Arunachal Pradesh. The Tawang region is possibly negotiable. India may not mind ceding the part of Arunachal Pradesh that is logically part of Tibet if it gets back its title to Aksai Chin as well as the rest of Arunachal.
3. India strongly aligns with Russia and China in terms of setting up an alternative to the US-controlled, dollarised global financial system.

Time is of the essence, because the global situation is changing from day to day. A quick resolution of issues between India and China can bring about an alignment of the most powerful non-Western countries, and a corresponding geopolitical balance.

[Check out my earlier posts on this topic:
1. "Quad Switch - How India Could Permanently Alter The Balance Of World Power (While Also Ensuring Its Own Best Interests)"
2. "How Indians Should Learn To Think About China"]

What The Ukraine Crisis Tells Us About The US

The long-simmering Ukrainian crisis has erupted into open conflict. What does this tell us about the US, though?

A map of the Ukraine showing the Crimean peninsula (seized by Russia in 2014) and the two breakaway provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk, where current fighting is concentrated

Let's look at three aspects of US behaviour leading up to this crisis.

1. The promise not to expand NATO

When the Soviet Union was collapsing, the US assured Gorbachev (both on its own and through Germany) that it would not seek to expand the borders of NATO eastwards.

We know what actually happened. The inclusion of East Germany into NATO as a result of German reunification was understandable, but then the following countries became NATO members too, and NATO's missiles moved closer and closer to Russia.

1. Czech Republic (1999), formerly part of the Warsaw Pact as Czechoslovakia
2. Hungary (1999), formerly part of the Warsaw Pact
3. Poland (1999), formerly part of the Warsaw Pact
4. Bulgaria (2004), formerly part of the Warsaw Pact
5. Estonia (2004), formerly part of the Soviet Union itself
6. Latvia (2004), formerly part of the Soviet Union itself
7. Lithuania (2004), formerly part of the Soviet Union itself
8. Romania (2004), formerly part of the Warsaw Pact
9. Slovakia (2004), formerly part of the Warsaw Pact as Czechoslovakia
10. Slovenia (2004), formerly part of neutral Yugolavia
11. Albania (2009), formerly part of the Warsaw Pact
12. Croatia (2009), formerly part of neutral Yugolavia
13. Montenegro (2017), formerly part of neutral Yugolavia
14. Macedonia (2020), formerly part of neutral Yugolavia

It's clear that the US adopted a winner-takes-all mentality against Russia, much like what the victors of World War I did to Germany through the Treaty of Versailles. We know how Germany reacted as a result of that oppressive treaty, so should Russia's reaction today be any surprise?

2. The support for democratic values

The US has always claimed to stand for democratic values against authoritarian regimes like Russia's.

But what actually happened in the Ukraine? There was a democratic election held in 2010, when Viktor Yanukovych defeated incumbent prime minister Yulia Tymoshenko in the race for president. Yanokovych's government therefore had legitimacy as a democratically elected one. However, Yanukovych's government was pro-Russia. In 2014, there were protests in Ukraine over the tilt towards Russia and away from Europe, and Yanukovych's elected government was deposed in a coup (not through an election) and replaced by one headed by Arseniy Yatsenyuk. This new government promptly signed an agreement with the EU.

Nobody knows if the protests against the Yanukovych government that culminated in his ouster were a genuine grassroots uprising or were engineered from outside, although one can hazard a guess.

In any case, it's clear that the US doesn't mind the ouster of a democratically elected government through a coup, as long as the change favours its own interests.

3. The promise of support against aggression

A lot of noise has been made by the US over the past few months over the imminent Russian invasion of the Ukraine, and the Ukrainian people were promised support against Russian aggression.

But what actually happened? In recent weeks, the US as well as its key European allies have ruled out sending troops to fight any invading Russian army, and have only threatened economic sanctions and support to Ukrainian insurgents. Once the invasion began, President Biden said that "the prayers of the entire world are with Ukraine".

It's clear that the US goads its vassal states into brinkmanship, but when the chips are down, they only send "thoughts and prayers". Not the most reliable ally. They deserted the Hmong in Vietnam, and they deserted their interpreters in Afghanistan. (Something for India to keep in mind as it takes on China with the imagined backing of the US.)

What the Ukraine crisis teaches us about the US

1. They're liars. Never believe them when they promise you something.

2. They're hypocrites. They do the opposite of what they claim to stand for.

3. They're impotent cowards. If you wade into battle on their behalf expecting them to back you up, good luck.

When The New York Times Proved To Be No Better Than Pravda

There was an old American joke I read long ago about the former Soviet Union, and it went like this:

There was a race somewhere between an American car and a Russian car, and the American car won. (Of course the American car won! This is an American joke, remember?)

The next day's headlines in Pravda said, "The Russian car came second, while the American car was next to last."

Ha, ha! Oh, those Russians!

I've been watching the medal tally at the Tokyo Olympics over the last couple of weeks, and something puzzled me about American reporting on this.

Normally, medal tallies are shown in descending order of gold, then silver, and then bronze medals. The country with the most golds is on top. If two countries have the same number of golds, then the one with more silvers goes above the other. Ditto if the two countries have the same number of golds and silvers. The country with more bronze medals goes above the other.

Not according to the New York Times, though.

In their reporting, the medal tally was sorted in descending order of total number of medals.

But wait, there's more!

One would think there would be no wiggle room when comparing gold medals, right?

Apparently, there is. You can shrink the icons on China's row to make it look much shorter than it is. That way, the US won't look quite so bad.

Unbelievable, right? I guess that's what a "free press" means. You're free to bend and twist the truth in any way you like. Not that it didn't get called out and ridiculed on Twitter and Reddit. In that context, I learnt a new word - copium.

Luckily for them, the US ended the Olympics with more gold medals than China (in addition to having more medals overall), so it could legitimately be at the top of the medal tally, and the media subterfuge of the previous few days went by unremarked.

Now you know why I don't believe the Western press when it comes to reporting on China. If they can distort such obvious facts to create a misleading impression, what else are they distorting?

Don't Buy The Covid Bioweapon Hypothesis? Let's Lead You There In Two Steps

[Update 12/06/2021: This post is no longer a prediction. Look for the link at the bottom of the post. The other shoe has already dropped.]

Given the subject matter at hand, I believe I will be forgiven for using an immunological phrase -- I still have antibodies in my system after a nasty bout of WMD-itis in 2003. In other words, if the Western establishment tries to demonise yet another country after the loot and plunder of Iraq, my reaction is (understandably) going to be one of contemptuous disbelief.

China is no angel in white, of course. Every conspiracy theory regarding China necessarily carries a non-zero probability at the very outset. In other words, no one trusts the Chinese government, and that includes a significant number of Chinese people.

Still, if we're trying to be as objective as implicit bias will let us be, we should be skeptical even if it's the devil himself who is being demonised.

My starting point in following the money is in recognising the most recent recurrence of the Thucydides Trap. The Thucydides Trap states that every rising power, however peaceful its intentions, necessarily threatens an established power, and history has shown that in 12 of the last 16 such cases, the situation has led to war. As a corollary, if a war is to be fought, it is in the interests of the rising power to delay the conflict until it is stronger, while the converse holds for the established power. It must strike before the rising power becomes any stronger.

In the context of the US and China, independent analysts have concluded that the US is under an imperative to move to contain China sooner rather than later, since every year's delay works to China's advantage.

But a move by the US against China will carry no legitimacy unless another convincing WMD story can be manufactured, and this is obviously proving hard to do since the boy has already cried wolf once too often.

A trial balloon was floated a year ago, and it was called the "Bioweapon hypothesis". It alleged that China deliberately engineered the SARS-CoV-2 virus to cripple the rest of the world while it surged ahead. If it had been widely accepted, that hypothesis should have stirred up enough outrage worldwide to endorse US-led punitive action against China. But as it happened, that hypothesis sank like a lead balloon with no takers.

However, such a hypothesis is vitally important to the US, because it remains the best basis for mobilising world opinion in favour of concerted action against China. The hypothesis needs to be revived through some other means.

And this is why I think we are now seeing the first of two steps through which we (even the WMD-immunised) will be led to accept the bioweapon hypothesis, and by extension, be led to support military/economic action against China.

Lots of whispered "evidence" in support of a Lab Leak Hypothesis is turning up, complete with little-known amateur actors, some with secret identities to boot, and documentation from obscure and now-sealed sources that, by definition, cannot be followed and verified. 

I predict that the other shoe will drop once this hypothesis gains sufficient acceptance, in the form of "evidence" that the Wuhan Institute of Virology is an arm of the Chinese military establishment.

Voila! Bioweapon.

The West has an inherent advantage in the propaganda war against China, which is that the Chinese government has inherently low credibility in the eyes of the rest of the world, and its denials are therefore going to be ineffectual from the very outset. Almost any charge can be made to stick, provided it sounds plausible.

The latest round of "evidence" in favour of the Lab Leak Hypothesis reads like the plot of a Sidney Sheldon novel. The report by Newsweek makes for a thrilling read.

My interpretation of this round of "evidence" covers the following points:

1. Western government and intelligence sources have no credibility anymore, thanks to WMD. Hence the source for the hypothesis has to be another set of actors.

2. Scientists and journalists are the obvious credible sources for such a hypothesis, but hardly any mainstream scientists or journalists have risen to the bait. Few have been willing to put their professional reputations on the line in support of this hypothesis.

3. Of the handful of media organisations willing to associate themselves with the hypothesis, none has high credibility. Media watcher site Ad Fontes Media doesn't seem to have a high opinion of any of the organisations (Business Insider, Mother Jones, The New York Post, and Fox News) that Newsweek listed in its latest report as being in its corner. These would be just the sort of news outlets that a government could use to push its views.

Ad Fontes Media's Media Bias chart showing the five media organisations that aligned themselves early on with the Lab Leak Hypothesis - not hugely confidence-inspiring

4. The Newsweek report describes the evidence gathered as establishing "probable cause -- a strong, evidence-based case for a full investigation". It carries a standard disclaimer ("None of this proves that the pandemic started in the Wuhan lab, of course: it's entirely possible that it did not."). And it heads off the demand for definitive proof with another disclaimer ("It's not clear that the best efforts of the U.S. and other nations to investigate the lab-leak hypothesis will ever turn up unequivocal evidence one way or another, at least without the full cooperation of China, which is unlikely.").

I have to wonder, if this is never going to go beyond the status of a hypothesis, why are we wasting our time on this? Unless the objective is something beyond finding the "truth".

5. Many of the players in the report are amateur investigators. That in itself is not necessarily a disqualification. However, the identities of some of the key players ("The Seeker", "Billy Bostickson") remain hidden, and it is unlikely that they can be cross-examined by anyone who wishes to. The nebulous nature of the main characters raises red flags with me.

6. Descriptions of the sources seem designed to prevent fact-checkers from verifying their veracity. ("he'd become an expert at searching the back alleys of the web, far beyond the well-lit places patrolled by Google", and "Shortly after The Seeker posted the theses, China changed the access controls on CNKI so no one could do such a search again."). In other words, we are told in advance that the evidence cannot be independently verified.

In short, the impression I get from this round of reporting is that a lot of mud is being thrown in the hope that some of it sticks. Given the pervasive suspicion of China among many, I'm sure some of this mud is going to stick.

From the enthusiastic forwards of these "findings" by many of my friends on social media, I'm going to accept that the Lab Leak hypothesis is going to find general consensus (even if I am myself unconvinced).

My immediate question is, what next?

A prediction - The other shoe is about to drop

Let me put my money where my mouth is, by making a prediction.

Once the Lab Leak Hypothesis is widely accepted, the other shoe is going to drop. We're going to be provided "evidence" (of similar quality) that the Wuhan Institute of Virology is an arm of the Chinese defence establishment. No amount of indignant protest from the Chinese government is going to be able to refute that allegation. Indeed, this could very well be an illustration of the well-known maxim, "Never believe a rumour until it has been officially denied".

Make no mistake, once the other shoe has dropped, the Bioweapon hypothesis is effectively legitimised. The SARS-CoV-2 virus originated from a lab controlled by the Chinese military establishment. Surely that could have had no benign intentions behind it.

And with that, the hawks will have the endorsement they need for the 13th violent enactment of the deadly Thucydides Trap.

[Update 12/06/2021: This has just happened.]

Quad Switch - How India Could Permanently Alter The Balance Of World Power (While Also Ensuring Its Own Best Interests)

A bolt from the blue

On April 7th 2021, less than a month after the first ever Quad Summit between the leaders of the US, India, Japan and Australia, the US Seventh Fleet issued a terse statement that it had "asserted navigational rights and freedoms approximately 130 nautical miles west of the Lakshadweep Islands, inside India's exclusive economic zone, without requesting India's prior consent, consistent with international law."

No doubt taken by surprise and embarrassed on the world stage by a country it had considered an ally, India lodged a muted protest, and the troubling episode raised questions about the alliance, especially the level of mutual respect on which it was based.

As a matter of principle, the US may have been right in asserting its freedom of navigation, since there is a difference between territorial waters and an exclusive economic zone. [Permission is required before a foreign ship enters a country's territorial waters. In contrast, an exclusive economic zone only means that a country has sole rights to exploit that area of the sea for economic gain, e.g., by fishing, drilling for offshore oil, etc. Merely sailing through a country's exclusive economic zone should not require permission.]

Setting aside questions of principle for the moment, what the US action demonstrated was its ready willingness to embarrass a country that was putatively a close ally in a strategically important grouping. The US perceived no negative consequences to itself from displeasing India, and the continuance of the relationship was taken for granted. That pointed diplomatic snub, and the lack of respect it implied, should be a reminder to India that its inclusion in the Quad is not a sign of its arrival on the global stage, but merely of its usefulness in the strategic plans of other nations.

With the wake-up call afforded by that splash of cold water by the US navy, what hard-headed analysis can India's policymakers carry out now?

Back to first principles

Here's my take on a hypothetical foreign policy shift by India that could be a geopolitical game-changer.

The big picture: Five centuries ago, with the age of colonialism, the West wrested power from the East, impoverishing and humiliating its great and rich civilisations, and has further succeeded in getting the rest of the world to play by rules that entrench rather than threaten Western power. However, Western power has been steadily flowing eastwards for a couple of decades now, and it could be argued that the only factor preventing a decisive restoration of the status quo ante is India's geopolitical ambivalence - its readiness to play handmaiden to the West against its fellow Eastern civilisations. There is no reason why the East should not reunite to dictate its own prosperity once again.

Let's start with some basic premises.

India has no fundamental quarrel with the leading powers of mainland Eurasia - China, Russia or Iran. These are all ancient civilisations that have co-existed for millennia. (A careful reading of history will show that India's current tensions with China are merely a border dispute that is very recent in that timescale, and further, of India's own making.)

In spite of cordial relations, India has no inherent alignment of interests with the countries of the West, and the relationship is in fact transactional. (For that matter, the national interests of Japan and Australia could also be more naturally aligned with those of China rather than the US, but that determination is for those countries to arrive at independently.)

Let us also agree on where the battle lines have been drawn.

China's swift rise over the last three decades has completely altered power equations around the world, but most emphatically in the Eurasian region. The most dramatic reset has been in Sino-Russian relations. At the time of the Chinese communist revolution in 1949, it was the former Soviet Union that was China's ally and senior partner. That relationship ruptured in 1969. Today, it has been restored, with Russia greatly diminished and willing to accept a junior role in its partnership with China. The two countries have been pushed into each other's arms because of open hostility from the US. The US has been aggressively arming Ukraine against Russia, and that could be a potential flashpoint in the near future.

Another major power in Asia is Iran, also an object of unbridled US hostility, including Trump's about-face that negated the normalisation promised by the Obama administration's civilian nuclear deal.

China, of course, has been identified by the US as their main geopolitical adversary today, and as independent analysts have pointed out, third countries have a stark "with us or against us" choice.

The China-Russia-Iran axis has been born of necessity, thanks to the unmistakeably hostile moves of the US against all of them.

The Quad alliance has a similar motivation, in that it is prompted by a shared fear of China.

As we can see, alliances are determined by geopolitical power struggles, and the current line-up of allies and adversaries has been determined as a result of the perspective and actions of the US.

It's instructive to consider that had India liberalised its economy earlier and grown faster than China, the US may have now enlisted China to help contain India. In geopolitics, there is no such thing as a "peaceful rise". All rising powers are inherently threatening to established powers. And hence there is no alliance that India "naturally" belongs to. 

India has independent agency

India does not have to blindly accept the cards that the US has dealt it and the world. It has the independent agency to look at geopolitics through its own lens, and determine for itself what sort of alliance would suit its interests best.

The battle lines having already been drawn, the composition of the two sides (apart from India) is now a given.

The questions India needs to ask itself are:

1. Where do the country's best interests lie? Should it remain in the US-led Quad? Should it be non-aligned between the blocs? Or should it switch sides?

As corollaries,

2. Are the democracies natural allies merely on account of their being democracies, or is this an appealing construct that helps the US? Remember that outside of the West, the US often finds it more convenient to form alliances with pliant dictatorships than with independent democracies.

3. Is India's perception of China as an adversary justified, or is this merely the result of unfortunate recent history and conditioned thinking?

I have in the past argued for Indian non-alignment between these two rival power blocs, but I now believe that the bolder option of switching sides should be seriously considered. Staying in the US-led Quad or being non-aligned are conventional options with largely predictable outcomes. In contrast, switching is a disruptive move with potentially large benefits for India, and the resulting shift in the balance of world power could itself mitigate the risks.

The battle lines as they have been drawn up suit the interests of the US, and a number of the consequences of India's current alignment with the US, most importantly the hostility of China, flow from that choice. On consideration, China is a threat to India only to the extent that India in turn positions itself as a threat to China. In other words, India can eliminate the threat from China by ceasing all acts of hostility and becoming an ally instead.

What the Chinese want is unquestioned recognition as the dominant power in Asia, but they are not interested in militarily invading or imposing a communist form of government on Asian countries. India does not need to fear Chinese interference in its internal affairs as a result of an alliance. As long as other countries cooperate with China, Beijing will allow them to coexist and even prosper. That's not a very different proposition from that offered by the United States!

There is thus no self-evident logic to India remaining in the US-led Quad. Forming a new Quad in alliance with China, Russia and Iran could in time begin to seem equally natural.

India's place - Perception and reality

While Indians tend to take great pride in the greatness of their own civilisation, some realism needs to temper that perception. In terms of relative power, India can only be a junior partner in either of these current groupings. It is grossly subservient to the US in the Quad (as has been so pointedly demonstrated by the Freedom of Navigation episode), and while it will be more influential within a China-led alliance, it will definitely be a junior partner.

In other words, India can never hope to be king. But it can be kingmaker. While its own power per se is limited, India is tremendously important in the world because it holds the balance of power.

India has the potential to bring about a very different world order, provided it alters its own mindset on two counts:

1. India needs to tell itself the truth about 1962. The Chinese did not stab India in the back after promising friendship. It was Nehru who rejected Zhou Enlai's peace deal in 1960, a deal that was extremely generous from today's perspective. It was Nehru (and his defence minister VK Krishna Menon) who needlessly provoked China with aggressive military intrusions that they called "Forward Policy". The Chinese merely counterattacked to teach Nehru a lesson, and then withdrew to the Line of Actual Control as before. The Chinese showed restraint in the face of unilateral Indian aggression. That was the true story of 1962.

2. India needs to accept the reality of its relative power with China. In the 1950s, and indeed, right up to the mid-1980s, there was rough parity between the two countries in economic and military terms, but the gap has widened to a factor of five in economic terms, with corresponding impacts on relative Comprehensive National Power. In any relationship with China, India will be the junior partner. It needs to acknowledge and accept that subordinate status.

Pax Sinica and a brave new world

Once India changes its current mindset, exciting options open up.

India can finally secure its land borders. 

The border dispute with China has always been about the mere demarcation of territory. Quite unlike the troubled relationship with Pakistan, no deeper historical resentments are involved. Zhou Enlai's generous offer in 1960 to give up all other Chinese claims in exchange for just Aksai Chin has probably lapsed. Settlement of the border dispute in today's world may require the giving up of Indian claims to Aksai Chin as well as the actual transfer of part of Arunachal Pradesh to China. Who knows, with shrewd bargaining, it may even be possible to get a much more favourable deal in exchange for the very considerable offer of an Indian defection! Once the prickly territorial questions are out of the way, the rest of the settlement will be a simple matter of agreeing the exact course of the Himalayan border, which in today's age, can be monitored to an accuracy of mere metres with GPS technology.

That will end the decades-long border dispute with China.

An additional factor in India's favour is that China also has an interest in seeing the India-Pakistan border dispute settled amicably, since the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, China's vital access route to the Indian Ocean, runs through the currently disputed region of Pakistan-controlled Kashmir. In the event of conflict between India and Pakistan, Chinese economic interests will be at severe risk, and China would like to eliminate that risk.

Pakistan is effectively a Chinese vassal state, and so it is politically feasible to turn the Line of Control between India and Pakistan into a mutually accepted border with China's blessing, and to have that agreement honoured by the Pakistani establishment. The giving up of claims to all of Kashmir will be a bitter pill for both India and Pakistan, but the benefits of a settlement will be enormous.

The end of hostilities with Pakistan will be a natural corollary of the normalisation of relations with China, and will be a huge relief to both India and Pakistan.

It is hard to overstate the impact of such developments, since insecure land borders have shaped India's perceptions ever since its independence as a modern nation.

This is just for starters.

The holy grail is a free trade zone comprising all of Eurasia, with greatly eased movement of goods and people, and the fastest growth in living standards for the largest number of people ever in world history. China lifted 800 million people from poverty in a single generation. India lifted 270 million people from poverty during a single decade. Together, and in concert with other countries, such economic miracles can be replicated throughout the Eurasian region.

Linking India's Golden Quadrilateral to China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) can unlock synergies that ripple beyond the two countries. Instead of competing for influence in other South- and South-East Asian states, India and China could collaborate in looping them into an economic free trade zone with seamless transport and communication infrastructure. For example, a land link from South India to Sri Lanka will be a reality if both India and China push for it.

All of Asia and much of Europe will become part of a giant economic zone, and every country in its ambit will see a spurt in growth and living standards.

Indians may remain reluctant to admit it, but they will owe their new era of prosperity to this Pax Sinica. They can of course take legitimate pride that they played a key role in bringing it about.

The repercussions

The natural question to ask is, will this shift not antagonise the US, and will it not have negative repercussions for India?

I believe that while the US is certain to be antagonised, it will find itself powerless to take hostile action against India. Virtually the whole of mainland Asia (including Russia) will be part of a united bloc under the leadership of China, and China will then act to protect its interests. India's defection will greatly improve China's own security situation, and together with Russia, China will in turn be able to provide a security guarantee to India against hostile US action.

It could be argued that India's defection carries risk as well as its own mitigation. The US could in fact find itself greatly diminished in power across the board as a result of this dramatic shift, and therefore less able to convey its displeasure in the terms the world has learnt to fear.

Europe may also decide to loosen its tight embrace of the US in the face of a united Asian alliance, which is also a much larger market than any other in the world. The incentive for trade could force Europe to break with the US and engage more positively with the Asian bloc. [There are signs that Europe is already beginning to walk a line independent of the US, as illustrated by this statement by Emmanuel Macron and by the joint statement by Macron and Angela Merkel.]

As for the remaining members of the erstwhile Quad, Australia and Japan will also be under tremendous pressure to distance themselves from the US.

As has been remarked, the Australian and Chinese economies are complementary, not competitive, in nature. Australia grows and prospers in tandem with China. It makes no sense for Australia to antagonise China, and there is tremendous internal pressure being put on the Australian government to step back from its adversarial position and normalise relations with China. My guess is that Australia will quietly fold in the next year or two regardless of what India does.

Japan is another country that needs to swallow its pride and do what is in its own best interests. Japan is a rapidly declining power, with an ageing demography and an economy that has been stagnating for well over two decades. Its path to continued prosperity lies in vigorous economic ties with China. The two things Japan needs to do first are these:

1. Apologise for the atrocities committed by its troops in World War II, such as the Nanjing massacre, and make reparations, however symbolic.

2. Give up its claims to the Senkaku (Diaoyu) islands. Unlike the Malvinas (Falkland) islands fought over by the UK and Argentina, these islands are uninhabited. Their "strategic" value is paradoxically negated by the fact that claiming them turns China into a powerful enemy, when it could be just a trading partner.

Over to you, India

All of these strategic pieces fall into place based on what India chooses to do. India can be a blocker, or an enabler, of the shift of power from the West back to the East, and the start of a new Eastern Golden Age.

The main impediments to such a foreign policy shift are in the Indian mind - an irrational fear of China, emotional baggage from a false narrative of the 1962 war, a misplaced pride in the second-to-none greatness of the Indian civilisation that precludes acceptance of a subordinate role in Asian affairs, a naive belief that democracies are natural allies when realpolitik has repeatedly demonstrated otherwise, and most importantly, policy inertia and the timidity to dream bold dreams.

[Also read my earlier post "How Indians Should Learn To Think About China".]

The Perils Of A Post-Trump World

Ding, dong, the witch is dead!

Much of the world, not just the blue part of the US, is celebrating the exit of the obnoxious Donald Trump. This was a man who managed to offend practically everyone, while appealing only to the insecurities and base emotions of his supporters.

But now that he's gone, what can we expect from his successor?

I think it would be a good idea for those who wanted to see Trump gone to step back a bit from the polemical view of Trump as the devil incarnate and Biden as an angel in white. The situation is far more nuanced, especially for those of us in the rest of the world outside the US.

What I wish for is a geopolitical stalemate where the US and China keep each other honest, and the rest of the world stays safe as a consequence. What I fear most is a cosy backroom deal between Biden and Xi that carves the rest of the world up between two rapacious superpowers.

For a start, Trump was a refreshingly different president from all of his predecessors, because the ugliness and naked self-interest in US foreign policy was laid bare for all to see. There was no pretence that the US stood for anything higher than its own self-interest. In being so famously transactional, Trump reduced the image of the US from its historical projection of exceptionalism to one where it was just another country with its own axe to grind. It was a bit of unwitting honesty from an American president not seen since the days of "Honest Abe".

That image may not altogether vanish, since the world cannot unsee what it has once seen.

Biden and his team will of course do their best to show that the US is back in the hands of the adults in the room, and the old, familiar lectures on freedom, democracy and human rights will once again be selectively heard whenever the US wants to effect a regime change to its advantage.

Even as things return to the old normal, disquieting aspects to the Biden administration are already beginning to be seen.

The first few appointees of Biden's team have been lobbyists and insiders of the Pentagon and the arms industry. His secretary of state is a known hawk. 

Watch the easy camaraderie between Antony Blinken (Democrat), and his interrogator Sen Lindsey Graham (Republican) during the former's confirmation hearing as incoming Secretary of State. US foreign policy stays constant, with bipartisan consensus.

For those with hopes of a more peaceful world, this is bad news. The arms industry thrives when there are conflagrations around the world, and so it is unlikely that President Biden is going to wind back the wars.

Right on cue, there have been bomb blasts in Afghanistan, Iraq, Algeria, Yemen and Syria. If an American president ever wanted an excuse not to draw down overseas troops, he will not want for options.

That's not the only piece of bad news.

One of the things that Trump should be given credit for was his recent approach to China. After some leniency in the earlier part of his term, Trump swung around to suspicion and hostility towards China, especially after Covid. He began to push back on China in every sphere. He did not blink on trade, and he began to unabashedly cultivate "the Quad" (consisting of the US, Japan, India and Australia) to signal his willingness to confront China militarily. His accompanying rhetoric was harsh and aggressive too.

China under Xi has been a bully, and in the manner expected of bullies faced with credible threats, the dragon blinked. Surprisingly meek and conciliatory statements issued from Beijing. The wolf warrior diplomats went into retreat.

China has no intention to pick a fight with the US
-- Wang Yi, Chinese State Councilor and Foreign Minister - Dec 18, 2020

It remains to be seen whether Biden will keep up that pressure. As a realist, I try to follow the money. The US arms industry gains from the forever war in the Middle East. China wants the freedom to expand its tentacles throughout Asia and up to the doors of Europe through its Belt and Road Initiative. It's not so much "free trade" as the ability for China to sell to every corner of the globe. The trade war between the US and China is hurtful to both.

A new administration in Washington is an opportunity for both countries to reset their relationship to mutual advantage. What I fear most is a backroom deal to avoid the trap of a new Cold War and to instead establish a cosy duopoly. The US keeps its existing backyards of the Americas and Europe, and gets to play its deadly war games in the Middle East. China gets untrammeled overlordship over all of Asia, including the Indian subcontinent. A new agreement is signed between the two superpowers of the East and the West that ends their bruising trade war.

[For countries like India, this would be unqualified bad news. The US has been an unreliable ally to India even at the best of times. (At the worst of times, it has been a vicious and vindictive enemy, as Nixon and Kissinger demonstrated during the 1971 Bangladesh war.) Abandonment of India by the US following a duopoly deal would mean that any putative hyphenation between India and China would disappear at a stroke. With the role of the US abruptly switched from security guarantor to the ally of an adversary, India's strategic options would narrow precipitously, and its fate would be left to the tender mercies of China. India would have to make significant territorial amends for its recent show of resistance to China's border incursions, and would have to very publicly accept China's suzerainty over all of Asia, including its own neighbourhood. It would be an unprecedented cultural humiliation in addition to being a permanent economic impost on future growth.

Australia, as part of the Anglosphere's "Five Eyes" alliance, will probably continue to receive US protection, but India will be jettisoned without a second thought. The fate of Taiwan and Japan is uncertain.]

Not all aspects of the US-China duopoly deal are likely to be settled quickly and amicably. The most interesting item on the negotiating table would be Africa, I imagine. There is no clear early winner between the US and China in terms of influence over Africa, and the continent could turn into a battleground. I see Africa as the new Poland for two schemers to pretend to agree on, before one of them betrays the other.

To sum up, it may be too early to go, "Ding dong, the witch is dead!" The main peril of the post-Trump era is the possible start to the new joint reign of the Wicked Witch of the West and the Wicked Witch of the East. The rest of the world should hunker down for a long and harsh winter.

The Fearsome Ghost Of Ayatollah Khomeini

Synopsis: Western countries are being silly to fear Iranian refugees on account of the threat of Islamic terror. Islamic terror is associated with Sunni Wahhabi Islam, not with the Shi'ite denomination of Islam that Iranians tend to follow. Australia should stop pleading with the US and simply absorb the Iranian refugees in its camps. The heavens will not fall.

The biggest news item of the last week was Donald Trump's phone call to Australia's Prime Minster Malcolm Turnbull, in which he ranted about the "dumb deal" that his predecessors had signed with Australia (to accept 1250 refugees from Australian refugee camps), and then hung up 25 minutes into a scheduled hour-long call, calling it his "worst call by far".

One could argue about how it actually went for Trump, but it almost certainly was Turnbull's "worst call by far"

At the heart of the dispute were about 2000 asylum seekers currently being held in detention at the two Australian offshore processing centres of Manus Island and Nauru.

On Nauru, of 1200 asylum seekers, 983 have been considered genuine refugees while 217 have not.
On Manus Island, of 859 asylum seekers, 669 have been considered genuine refugees, while 190 have not. That makes a total of 1652 (=983+669) genuine refugees.

Of the 1652 genuine refugees, the US (under Obama) agreed to take 1250. The remainder were to be resettled in Papua New Guinea and Cambodia. (Australia has harsh immigration laws that say that no one who gets onto a boat and attempts to reach Australia will ever be settled in Australia. They can only be settled in PNG or elsewhere, the so-called "Pacific Solution". It's a policy that has been quite effective in discouraging people smuggling.)

Although no hard figures seem to be available, Iranians seem to be the dominant cohort in both processing centres, with smaller contingents from Iraq and Somalia. All of these asylum seekers fall afoul of Trump's executive order banning the entry of people from 7 "countries of concern" (Iraq, Syria, Libya, Iran, Yemen, Somalia and Sudan).

As of the time of writing, the US seems to be reluctantly going ahead with the agreement, but only on the basis of "extreme vetting" of the refugees.

If the ostensible reason for this "extreme vetting" is fear of unwittingly importing terrorists, then there is a simple solution that suggests itself immediately - check that the Iranians are indeed Shi'ites and let them into Australia without further ado. My reasoning is explained below, as well as my theory about why this simple solution doesn't seem to strike Australian decision-makers.

The simple fact of the matter is that all the acts of "Islamic terror" perpetrated in recent times have been at the hands of Sunni Muslims subscribing to the hardline Wahhabi strain of Islam. Iranians are not even Sunni, and have not been implicated in acts of terror. There was one singular exception, although this had its own twist. In December 2014, a lone Iranian gunman (Man Haron Monis) took hostages in a siege at the Lindt Chocolate Cafe in Martin Place, Sydney. Two people apart from Monis himself were later killed in a shootout when police stormed the establishment. I admit I was surprised when I heard the initial reports that the gunman was Iranian, but the riddle was solved shortly thereafter. It was revealed that Monis had converted to Sunni Wahhabi Islam just a month earlier.

To my mind therefore, the West suffers from a fear of all Muslims, which irrationally includes Shi'ite Iranians. If there is anyone they need to be wary about, it is Sunni Muslims who ascribe to one of the hardline sects, such as the Wahhabis, Salafis, or Deobandis. Shi'ites simply do not pose a threat.

In addition, I tend to take a civilisational view of human history and cultural evolution, and therefore I accord a certain level of "pre-assigned respect" to the people descended from the ancient Persian civilisation. Persians are a distinct people from the Arabs, and are also distinct from people of the Turkish civilisation. As people belonging to the proud Persian civilisation, the Iranians are in general a cultured and educated people. Immigrants from Iran will be an asset to any society that takes them in.

I think it was the shock of Ayatollah Khomeini's 1979 revolution that has scarred a generation of Western decision-makers. To them, there is an unbroken continuum from Khomeini to Bin Laden and thereafter to ISIS. But this is a false association. The Iranian revolution was confined to Iran. Even the limited mischief that Iran has engaged in outside its borders has been in its immediate neighbourhood through Hezbollah. It has never sought to export its revolution to the West or attempted to establish a worldwide caliphate. Hence, even though Iran is painted as a villain by Israel and many of the Arab states, and this is lapped up by a gullible West, the truth is that there is no threat to the wider world either from Iran or from Iranian emigrants.

Rather than bow and scrape before Trump's administration in an attempt to hold the US to its agreement, I believe Australia should make a one-time exception to its "Pacific Solution" and simply absorb all the Iranian refugees without further process. The Sunni refugees will unfortunately have to proceed with the "extreme vetting" that the US insists upon.

Decoding The Superman Meme

You've seen the movies, you've read the comics, but do you really get the story?

Let me share with you my understanding of the Superman story. I was introduced to Superman at a very early age, perhaps before I was 10. I have always liked the character, not just for his superpowers but for his goodness. Even today, if I had to name a few characters from history and fiction who epitomise nobility and goodness, Superman would be among them. But it was only as I grew and reflected on the stories from time to time that the real theme of the character's life story began to dawn on me, and this realisation was entirely my own, uninfluenced by the reviews and critiques of other people. I now see in hindsight that the Superman story is an allegory that is just screaming out to be understood by anyone who looks a little beyond the superficial.

There's the purely literal storyline, of course, and most of us are content to accept this at face value.

Where is Superman from? The planet Krypton.

What kind of place is it? It's a doomed world that explodes just after he leaves.

What is his real name? Kal-El.

Where on Earth does the baby Superman land? In the US.

Where in the US? In Kansas.

Where in Kansas? In a town called Smallville.

Who are his foster-parents? Jonathan and Martha Kent, simple farmers.

What is he known as on Earth? Clark Kent.

Where does Superman go to work as an adult? In Metropolis.

What's his secret identity? A mild-mannered reporter for the Daily Planet.

Who's his girlfriend? Lois Lane, a smart and plucky reporter in the same office.

Look beyond the literal and you will begin to see the allegory. As I began to unravel it, I became somewhat disappointed, because Superman's story is an American story, and even though it has universal appeal, it's not really a story that's meant for non-Americans (except in that "what's good for America is good for the world" kind of way).

The planet Krypton is an allegory for a faraway country. The country itself has no hope, and is sliding into anarchy. Superman is therefore an immigrant, and a refugee at that. Of course he comes to the US, which welcomes the tired, the poor, the huddled masses yearning to breathe free. And where does he grow up? Well, if you look at the map, Kansas is a state that is right in the very heart of the US.

And "Smallville" very literally and obviously means a small town (for an allegory, it's big and unsubtle enough to trip over). So he grows up in a small town in the heart of the US, brought up by simple and honest country folk. The implication is obvious. Here's an immigrant, naturalised as an American by imbibing the best folk values of middle America. And even when he goes to work in the big city (named Metropolis - the allegory-spinners are really hitting us over the head with a sledgehammer here), he still doesn't lose his small-town values. He remains modest and well-mannered and more than a little socially awkward. But he then starts to do enormous good, and the stories are all about his wonderful deeds and exploits. In other words, the immigrant makes good -- big time.

That's really the core of the Superman meme - the immigrant who imbibes American values, realises his potential and makes good even as he does good.

What a package!

Why do I like Superman so much? Because I identify with him. No, I have no super-powers (not any that I'm conscious of, anyway), but I see in him an introvert like myself. People only know me by my accomplishments. They think about me in terms of where I have studied or what kind of work I do, but none of that is me. No one knows my inner self. I keep that strictly to myself. Similarly, it is a mistake to be misled by our hero's flashy costume and all those thrilling action sequences. They do not define him. In his heart, Superman is not a flamboyant super-hero. He is private and self-effacing. In fact, the costumed superhero is Superman's secret identity behind which he hides. His true persona is Clark Kent. I identify with Clark Kent.

But what about the superpowers? Where do they fit in? Look a little deeper at the immigrant angle to the story. Immigrants are self-selecting. They move of their own will, and even if some of them are in a sense "forced" to move by harsh circumstance, it is still their choice. After all, millions more of their kind never move even when faced with the same crises. So immigrants differ in a fundamental aspect of character both from their compatriots in the old country and from the natives of their adopted one. They have innate qualities of entrepreneurship and risk-taking, and when exposed to the opportunities that their new country gives them, they tend to become extremely successful. They attain superpowers under a yellow sun.

I'm reminded of Hungarian András Gróf, who fled communist Hungary to come to the US, where he changed his name to Andrew Grove and founded Intel Corp. That's a classic Superman story.

Or of German Heinz Alfred Kissinger, who fled Nazi Germany to arrive in the US, changed his name to Henry Kissinger and eventually rose to become Nixon's Secretary of State. Kissinger was even more like Superman than Andy Grove in a literal sense. He was legendary for being able to hop around the world at a frenetic pace without suffering from jetlag.

Is this just a wild theory with no supporting facts? Well, if you want to understand a fictional character and what makes him tick, you need to dig into the biography of his creator(s). Joe Schuster and Jerry Siegel, the creators of Superman, were both Jewish immigrants from Europe. Schuster's father was from the Netherlands and his mother from Ukraine. Siegel's parents were from Lithuania. They and their families lived the Superman story themselves. They were outsiders in America, and I would guess they were grateful to their adopted country. That's why Superman is alien but loyal to America.

But there's more. Superman appeared in the 1930s, during a wave of exclusively European immigration to the US, supported by the National Origins Formula that favoured Central, Northern and Western Europe. That's why Krypton, although a planet far removed in geography and culture, is nevertheless populated by Caucasians. Superman may have had a strange foreign name and come from a different culture, but he was reassuringly Caucasian. He pretty much had to be. And the mere cultural differentness was overcome by American programming, which made him acceptable in a way that a truly alien alien, however benign and noble, could never be.

There's probably a good reason why that other DC Comics alien superhero, J'onn J'onzz (aka Martian Manhunter) never became as popular as Superman. His skin tone is green, of course, but his features are African, and that's probably a stronger differentiator.

However, there are subtle undertones to Superman's Caucasian ethnicity. He has black hair, not blond. It further reinforces the idea that he represents an Ashkenazi (Caucasian) Jew, very few of whom are blond. And his name, Kal-El, sounds Hebrew, redolent of the name of the Israeli airline, El-Al. Some believe Kal-El means "Voice of God" in Hebrew.

There is one very powerful (dare I say "spiritual") aspect to Superman's character. He does not kill. He is merciful even to enemies who he knows would gladly kill him given half a chance. He's a far better man than I am in that respect. In his place, I don't think I'd spare someone who I knew was going to try to kill me at the next available opportunity. [Thirty years after I was introduced to Superman, I came across another such impossibly noble fictional character, and that was The Doctor.]

Another "spiritual" angle to Superman's character is that in spite of his super-powers, he is modest, not arrogant. The analogue to his character in Hindu mythology is Hanuman, who can fly and has super-strength, but remains modest and devoted to Lord Rama.

"I'm the man with the cape" is a statement of responsibility, not hubris

I found this very nice summarisation of Superman's character from one of the comics I recently read, because it depicts both his own nature as well as the expectations that people begin to have from him.

They do, don't they?

There are also some conflicting themes in the Superman philosophy for those who view the American model through a capitalist lens. If that other Jewish immigrant, Russian emigré Alyssa Rosenbaum (later known as Ayn Rand), had had anything to do with Superman's creation, he might have been a somewhat less likeable character. As it stands however, Superman's philosophy is community-oriented to the point of being a little socialistic. He doesn't use his super-powers to enrich himself, although he could easily do that. This talented and assimilated immigrant doesn't just live for himself. He believes in community values and works for those around him in the best tradition of volunteerism. Not only that, one of his biggest enemies is the ultra-capitalist Lex Luthor, the head of Lexcorp. For those looking for an icon of capitalist America, Superman isn't it.

This then, in a nutshell, is the Superman meme. Moviemakers may explore variants to the storyline, but they may not violate the meme itself except very carefully and consciously. In the hands of the uninsightful, the delicate strength of this epic can be rudely shattered. I'll critique the Superman movies next, using this meme as the framework.