The "Civilisation State" - Phoenix, Werewolf Or Chimera?

Two essays, two biases

Two essays debating the "Civilisation State" have recently appeared.

The first one by Bruno Maçães is titled "As Western Liberalism Declines, Civilization States Return".

The second one, a partial rebuttal by Shashi Tharoor, is "Civilization States Are Profoundly Illiberal".

Both authors agree on one point — that a civilisation state represents a political system different from Western liberal democracies. Their titles are largely self-explanatory, although Maçães straddles the fence on whether he approves of "civilisation states" or not. His tone seems to be one of resignation at their inevitability, but one can also detect some pleasure at the deserved demise of Western liberalism. Tharoor is resolutely against civilisation states and for Western liberalism. I would encourage you to check out both these essays for yourself before reading my take on them.

At the outset, I have to say I found Maçães's essay much harder to understand, and I suspect it's because (with all due respect to his scholarship) his definitions of crucial terms seem ambiguous and shifting, and some of his arguments appear to contradict one another. He does raise some interesting and topical points though, and hence his essay cannot be dismissed for its lack of rigour.

Tharoor's essay is more relatable, although I believe his arguments are driven more by idealism than by realism.

I set great store by intellectual honesty, which is the ability to see things as they are, and not as one wants them to be. Discussing a topic with intellectual honesty can be confronting rather than comforting. So while Maçães's meandering article is hard to understand and pin down, he doesn't shy away from making his reader uncomfortable by touching upon some unpalatable truths. Tharoor's vision is a more soothing one, but one that I suspect is more divorced from reality. There needs to be a third viewpoint (and a fourth, and a fifth...)

As the author of an essay on why Indians need to understand their own civilisational history to make sense of the modern world, I feel compelled to provide one such alternative viewpoint.

Setting things straight

For a start, I believe Samuel Huntington (author of The Clash of Civilizations) deserves far more credit than he has received. His advocacy of a civilisational model of world history, which he contrasts against both narrow nationalism and against universal liberalism, is the Goldilocks model that seems just right. The civilisational view is in contrast to the globalist or humanist view of the entire world being one society. While the latter is a wonderful ideal, it is clearly not a view shared by the majority of the world's people, only by a few liberals. Civilisations are also different from nation-states in being far more long-lived, because they are based on more durable aspects of people's lives than political borders — aspects such as genetics, geographical origin, language and religion. And so, Maçães is wrong when he makes an arbitrary and unsubstantiated distinction between civilisation and identity ("Identity is the mutilated corpse of civilization."). The two concepts are in fact inseparable. Civilisation is meaningless without identity.

Maçães also outrageously misquotes Huntington on the topic of Ukraine. Huntington did not say that Ukraine and Russia belonged to the same civilisation! In fact, he explicitly spoke about a "civilisational fault line" that ran down the middle of Ukraine. According to him, the Eastern part of Ukraine belonged to the Orthodox civilisation, just like Russia. The Western part (what he called Uniate Ukraine) belonged to the Western civilisation. Huntington was prescient enough to see a civil war in Ukraine as being far more likely than a war between Russia and Ukraine. To be fair to him, that is in fact what the Ukraine war is mainly about — the wrenching of the Donbas (Eastern Ukraine) away from the Ukrainian nation-state and its incorporation into Russia, where it belongs in a civilisational sense. The results of the popular referenda in Crimea and the Donbas bear out Huntington's prediction.

What Maçães tells us that Huntington said about Ukraine...

...versus what Huntington actually said about Ukraine. Shocking and worthy of a libel suit.

What compounds this intellectual crime is Maçães's abandonment of objectivity. His visceral distaste for Russia and his disingenuously hagiographic view of Ukraine do his reputation no favours.

If Russia today represents the rule of instinct and unreason, Ukraine is the affirmation of light and progress.

(Yeah, right. Ukraine was ranked the second most corrupt country in Europe in 2021, but after Feb 24 2022, it has magically transformed into the affirmation of light and progress!)

Russia under the perpetually inebriated Boris Yeltsin (1991-1999) was a liberal democracy. That period saw the worst decline in the country's living standards, an alarming rise in alcoholism, and an unprecedented drop in life expectancy, all in the service of oligarchs who acquired the state's resources for a song. Then Vladimir Putin took charge, arrested his country's dangerous slide, reversed it with an iron fist and — dare I say it — made Russia great again.

The resurgent Russia of today is (unapologetically) no longer liberal. Yet we are expected to cheer for liberalism because.

Cheers! (hic!)

I also respect Huntington a lot for his admission that he did not understand the Indian civilisation. Huntington with his admitted ignorance in fact made far more insightful remarks about India than many others who claim to be knowledgeable about the country. Far from being ignorant about the nature of Indian civilisation, his comments showed that he recognised its complex, hybrid and layered nature. The Indic civilisation (which is the term I use in order to distinguish it from both the Indian nation-state and the Hindu religion) is not a simple one to describe or to understand. To his great credit, Huntington did a far better job of it than many other authors I have read.

What then is the definition of a "civilisation state"?

Here's my view. If a nation-state is to be considered a "civilisation state", its operating principles must go along the grain of its people's inherent and historical values and beliefs, rather than values and beliefs that are alien to them. That's it.

Note that this is not a value judgement on whether a civilisation state is "better" than one that is organised differently. It is merely a definition — my definition — one that is clear and understandable, and one that I will stick to without shifting goalposts or contradicting myself. (Mr Maçães, please take note.)

From this definition, China and Russia are not the first civilisation states to make a resurgence in our times, contrary to what Maçães avers. We have had civilisation states in our world for decades, even centuries. Muslim countries governed by Sharia law are civilisation states. Their operating principles align with the historical values of their people and are largely accepted by them.

And so, this is the very first point I would make on the topic of civilisation states. They are not a phoenix newly rising from the ashes of liberal states. They have always been around. We just haven't been conditioned to view them as such.

The typical blind spots of the Indian liberal

Tharoor does an able job of demolishing Maçães's confused and confusing essay, providing us with a detailed delineation of all his contradictions and fallacies.

Where Tharoor himself falters is in letting his arguments be guided by the knee-jerk reactions that Indian liberals suffer from, with respect to a couple of topics.

The first of these topics is China.

"China bad" is an article of faith among both Western and Indian thinkers. The groupthink that occurs across these two diverse and disparate cultures lulls both sides into a belief that they are being objective and rational, when they are in fact in an echo chamber of transcontinental dimensions.

Neither the West nor India really understands China. I would go so far as to say both shrink from attempting an unbiased analysis of China, because of their deepseated fear that an honest portrayal of a successful rival will show up their own failures of governance in a way that leaves them no excuse. More on this in a bit.

Tharoor's second knee-jerk reaction is to the notion of the civilisation state that the BJP has constructed, which is of course based on a sectarian Hindu identity designed to exclude India's minorities. However, a rejection of the BJP's model of a civilisation state should not lead to the rejection of the notion of a civilisation state itself! Tharoor is throwing out the Indic baby along with the Hindutva bathwater. A civilisation state isn't inherently a werewolf that will devour its citizens, and so India doesn't have to reject this model to save its people. It is possible for India to be a civilisation state, with the crucial caveat that the civilisation be Indic, not just Hindu. The Indic civilisation is a tapestry that contains layers upon layers of genetics, culture, ideas and innovation, from both internal and external sources, folded in upon itself over the course of millennia, not just centuries. Hinduism is a crucially important element of the Indic civilisation, but if all other strands are pulled out of it, the fabric will simply collapse and cease to exist. If Hindus fail to understand this, it is deeply ironical, since it means that they are unable to experience the "Viswaroopa-darshanam" of their civilisation, and they can only see one limited view of it.

Liberalism versus a civilisation state

Before going any further, it's important to first address the basic confusion around liberalism and a civilisational state. Maçães says different things at different times. He labels liberalism as Western in his title, but later asserts that it is universal. Tharoor meekly agrees with Maçães's latter assertion that liberalism is universal, not Western, and that civilisational states each have their indigenous ideological basis that sets them apart from these universal ideals.

So is liberalism Western or universal?

Let's not pussyfoot around the nature of liberalism, particularly its provenance. Liberalism is a good idea in that it postulates the equality of every human being, and their right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. However, just because it is a good idea and is applicable to all people equally, it does not follow that the idea is universal! This is the fallacy many fall victim to.

If I have a theory about all of humanity, that does not make it a "universal" theory. It is still just my theory, even though I claim that it applies to every human being on earth.

The Western liberal worldview is just that. It is a view of all of humanity, but it is still only a Western worldview. It is not "universal".

You want proof? The shibboleth is the notion of "tolerance" as opposed to "mutual respect". Would an advocate of liberalism look at the practices of non-Western civilisations in a spirit of mutual respect, or would their attitude be one of tolerance at best, and condemnation at worst? You know the answer.

In support of his argument that liberalism is not Western but a universal, or civilisationally neutral, set of ideas, Maçães says "Liberals wanted their political values to be accepted universally, much like a scientific theory enjoys universal validity [...] Western civilization stopped being a civilization, or at least it stopped seeing itself as a civilization. [...] Its principles were meant to be broad and formal, no more than an abstract framework of relations."

I disagree. Western civilisation did not jettison its own civilisational views in favour of a neutral set of ideas. The ideas of liberalism — that came out of the European Enlightenment — were as Western as the ideas they replaced. The West then tried to make these latter homegrown values seem universal. It cajoled and pushed other cultures, nation-states and civilisations to adopt them wholesale because they were now "universal".

They were not. They were always Western values.

[Maçães also treats us to the heretofore unheard-of idea that even Europe could possibly reject the universalist liberal model and pursue its own version of a civilisation state! He writes a number of words about this without saying much, but in the spirit of intellectual honesty that would not shy away from confronting ideas, I will venture an opinion on what such a European civilisation state would look like. Shorn of its more recent ideas of liberalism, the West would regress to being a white supremacist society that is also devoutly Christian. In short, a European civilisation state bereft of liberalism would simply be a Fourth Reich with Catholics and Protestants at each other's throats. So the idea that Europe (or the West) could possibly turn its back on liberalism does not prove that liberalism is not Western. It just shows that liberalism is a more evolved set of  —  Western —  ideas.]

Maçães makes the important point that in spite of liberalism's vaunted universality, it cannot overcome more visceral instincts: "Liberalism wanted to build a lasting edifice of reason and logic, but it turned out to be incapable of reaching large areas of collective existence. It remained, to a considerable extent, powerless over the brute facts of social life to which no reasoning could be applied — nationalism, fascism, and religious and racial bigotry being just a few examples."

I agree with this observation. India adopted a constitution inspired by the European Enlightenment. Its ideals may be noble and desirable — but they are not Indian.

This is not a value judgement, just a statement of fact. Anjum Altaf quoted Dr Ambedkar in this article "The Real India": "Democracy in India is only a top-dressing on an Indian soil, which is essentially undemocratic."

Rather than be outraged by this observation, the intellectually honest way forward would be to acknowledge its validity and explore whether democracy is the only mechanism to run a country fairly, i.e., the only system that can ensure good governance.

Democracy and individual rights

We need to digress to discuss an important issue that is often glossed over — the difference between the related concepts of a democracy and a constitutional republic. Democracy refers to the prevalence of the will of the majority, whereas constitutions tend to protect the rights of the individual, even against the will of the majority. So what exactly is the ideal society — one that is democratic (and reflects the will of a possibly bigoted majority), or one that is governed by a constitution that places limits on the will of the majority when it infringes the rights of the individual?

Note that a pure democracy would be no different from a civilisation state, because the country would be governed according to the (traditionalist) views of the majority, with no liberal constitution to impose an extraneous set of constraints.

This brings us to the crux of what disturbs liberals when a civilisation state is discussed. People shouldn’t be allowed to get whatever they want, because they may want the “wrong” things. They need a civilising influence such as a constitution inspired by Western liberalism, which constrains what they can ask for.

Squaring the circle

I'll stop being snarky about liberals now, because I'm probably one myself. I too like the values of the European Enlightenment and would like to see them widely, if not universally, adopted.

What doesn’t sit right with me is the notion of dictating to people what they should want, by constraining their choices from above. That doesn’t seem liberal to me. To paraphrase Tharoor, it’s a liberal constitution that is profoundly illiberal, because it acts as a constraint on pure democracy (the will of the majority).

What then about individual rights, freedom of speech, the right to life and liberty, and so many other important ideas? Should we force these noble ideas on uncivilised non-Western people, or would that make us illiberal?

The situation isn’t as hopeless as it looks, though.

The key to incorporating new ideas into a civilisation state is … social engineering. If a people can be taught to appreciate certain values such that they willingly adopt them, then when the organising principles of the state are aligned with the values of its people, one could have a civilisation state that is also liberal!

Societies are not static. People can be influenced. This is how civilisations develop and evolve. They absorb influences from internal reformers as well as through external examples, and they morph. Civilisation states can therefore be engineered. They are not givens.

The mistake that people in democracies make is in thinking that change can only come to societies from below, and that social engineering from above (by governments) is inherently evil.

Not so. Much-reviled communist governments have rooted out feudalism, educated their illiterate peasant masses, reduced inequality and empowered women on a scale that would put liberal democracies to shame.

So that's the solution to the liberal conundrum. Not to impose from above a liberal constitution that is alien, but to educate and socially engineer a population to incorporate liberal values into their thinking. Warning: it may take generations, for every civilisation needs to live through its own Enlightenment for such values to become self-evident and to stick.

Also consider that Western liberalism may not be the only moral path. Non-Western civilisations have highly evolved moral concepts of their own that often go unrecognised. [See Section 4.3 of my essay for a detailed discussion.]

The China syndrome

Let's return to the uncomfortable topic of China. China is feared by democratic societies because it has become such a success that it cannot be dismissed like the Soviet Union. The democracies (and only the democracies!) demonise China because they cannot afford to have their populace ask uncomfortable questions about why their purportedly more responsive system has not done as much for them as an evil, authoritarian communist dictatorship has done for its citizens. How has China managed to lift hundreds of millions of its people out of poverty and into the middle class in a single generation? How has it managed to eliminate extreme poverty? How did it manage to protect its citizens from the pandemic, with far fewer hospitalisations and deaths per-capita than the greatest democracies, even while being the only significant economy to grow during this period? These questions cannot be answered honestly in democracies. Indeed, these questions must not even be asked. Instead, the Chinese civilisation state, with its unique and successful relationship between the rulers and the governed, must be cast as one characterised by the "suppression of minorities, repression of free speech and outlawing of political dissent".

Pre-emptive delegitimisation. It works. Up to a point.

(If you think "liberal democracies" don't persecute dissidents for free speech, I have two words for you: Julian Assange.)

Good governance - It's not a Western idea

So when we strip away the myth of Western civilisational superiority, we see that constraining the will of the majority on the basis of Western concepts (however noble some of us may think they are) is neither ideal nor justifiable. We are forced to focus on the only thing that should matter — good governance.

Plato's Republic is a seminal Western treatise on the relationship between the rulers and the ruled, but it's hardly unique. The Indian concept of "Raj-dharma" that rulers must abide by, the Chinese notion of the "Mandate of Heaven" that a ruler can forfeit if they are unworthy, the Sharia law of Islamic states, all of these point to a concept accepted by every civilisation — that people should be governed according to a set of impartial and clearly defined rules, and not according to the arbitrary whim of a ruler.

Clearly, non-Western civilisations too have developed standards and rules of governance that are focused on the welfare of the governed. So why should the concept of civilisation states be greeted with such horror?

(If one is cynical enough to point out that these rules of governance are mainly observed in the breach, it may be worth considering representative democracy in the West and asking if elected representatives make laws and decisions to benefit their constituents or the lobby groups that fund their election campaigns.)

Liberalism in international relations

Tharoor makes one more point against civilisation states.

"In international politics, similarly, the notion that civilization states can follow their own standards overlooks the need for universally accepted norms to sustain world order"

This is however a non sequitur — a nation's internal governing principles have nothing to do with how it behaves in the comity of nations! A country can be a democracy at home while claiming exceptionalism and being a ruthless hegemon abroad, or it can be a dictatorship at home while aligning scrupulously to international law. How a country behaves towards others is of relevance to the outside world. How a country conducts its internal affairs is no one else's business. The latter statement is not because dictatorship or the denial of human rights is acceptable, but because the alternative (of exporting freedom and democracy using regime change and drone warfare) has proven such a humanitarian disaster and such a shameful scandal.

It is a smug belief in the superiority of liberal societies over all others that results in the condonement of crimes against the people of those other societies.

So rather than be liberal in international relations, let's be libertarian instead. Let's leave other countries alone.

Let's not regime-change them when they're weak.

When they're strong, let's not provoke them into war to make them look like the bad guys.

Tharoor makes a point about fig leaves in the context of internal governance, but he fails to acknowledge its flip side.

"Just as the devil can quote scripture for his purpose, the advocacy of “civilization states” all too often masks the malign intentions of tyrants."

This is the flip side: The advocacy of "universal values" like freedom, democracy and human rights all too often mask the malign intentions of hegemons.

Conclusion

At the end of the day, these are the only ground rules that will work:

- Nations must obey International Law, with none considered an exception to the rules.

- Internally, nations should govern themselves using organising principles that resonate with their people's values and beliefs. They should be civilisation states rather than govern their people using an alien set of rules.

- The values and beliefs of people are not rigid and unchanging. They can be influenced in a variety of ways - by their own governments' social engineering efforts, by their own internal grassroots movements, and by the seductive soft power of other cultures.

The civilisational state is therefore not a chimera. It is very real. We are seeing more examples of successful societies that call themselves civilisation states, and this is giving rise to concern and even panic among others. The complacency and hubris of states that adopted liberal values (whether homegrown or imported) are being shown up.

We can calm our panic by realising that (1) civilisations are not static but evolving, and (2) liberal democracy is just one of the means to a desired end. That end is good governance, and every political system claims it as its objective.

It's time for some intellectually honest conversations about systems that work for their people and systems that don't.

Why It Makes No Sense For Russia To Agree To A Ceasefire In Ukraine Now

In his article "Ukraine: The Other Side Of The Story", author Paul Heywood-Smith has taken a refreshingly different position on the conflict than the conventional Western one. He has made a genuine attempt to understand the situation from Russia's perspective, and ends the article with a call for a ceasefire.

Russia should cease all current operations to not only bring more territory under its control, but also to weaken the Ukrainian resolve by attacking infrastructure.

Ukraine should cease all military operations to expel Russians from such territory as they are in control of.

And third parties, particularly the US, the UK, European and Nato countries, Canada and Australia, should cease providing weapons and materials which enable the war to continue.

From a humanitarian perspective, I'm all for an immediate ceasefire that will end the killing and destruction at once. In fact, the war should never have been allowed to happen. The US bears primary responsibility for provoking Russia with existential security threats and supporting the extreme persecution of Russians in Eastern Ukraine. (Read this detailed analysis if you don't agree.)

The humanitarian perspective notwithstanding, I don't believe it makes any sense for Russia to agree to a ceasefire at this stage. The following excerpts from my tweets, suitably elaborated, will explain why.

From Russia's perspective, it is poised to inflict such a crushing blow on Ukraine, NATO, Europe and the US that it can demand virtually anything next year.

Ukraine is not just a theatre of military conflict. It will permanently alter global perceptions and hence the world order. This is Russia's chance to show up the US-led West as a loser that no country will side with hereafter. Why stop short of such a victory?

NASA's image of Europe at night (worldview.earthdata.nasa.gov) shows Ukraine in total darkness after Russia's crippling strikes on its energy infrastructure.

Even today, when it should be clear that Ukraine is on its last legs, Western commentary talks about "Putin's miscalculation", "Russia's futile war", etc. The Western media narrative is deliberately divorced from reality. A ceasefire at this stage will expectedly be spun as a Russian defeat.

Russia needs to pursue the war to the point when reality can no longer be denied, and the West's lies are exposed for what they are. At that point, the West's defeat at the hands of the Russia-China alliance will be complete.

That's why I believe a ceasefire now is not in Russia's interest.

Some may argue that the West, or at least the moderate sections of Western society, need to agree to this change in the world order. There is a further view that these voices are more likely to be influenced by China's peaceful, development-based approach rather than a Russian military victory.

I have two points against this argument.

1. The Russian and Chinese approaches are complementary. Russia is showing up the West's impotence, while China is holding up an alternative model based on development & trade as opposed to conflict. Since it's clear that Russia and China are on the same side, the West doubly loses.

2. This may sound harsh, but it really doesn't matter what any faction in the West thinks, once the world order has been demonstrably changed. The West is simply not as relevant as it likes to believe. Power has been shifting eastwards for years, but perceptions tend to lag reality. It will take a dramatic event such as a comprehensive Western rout in Ukraine to make it obvious to everyone that the world has permanently changed.

A Creative Solution To The India-China Border Row

I've read a great deal about the roots of the India-China border conflict - quite a few online articles, and three books in particular.

1. India After Gandhi, by Ramachandra Guha
2. India versus China (Why They Are Not Friends), by Kanti Bajpai
3. Powershift, by Zorawar Daulet Singh

Another important book is "India's China War" by Neville Maxwell, which is based on the yet-unreleased Henderson-Brooks Report (HBR). I have read excerpts of this book.

In a nutshell, the situation is complex, nuanced and characterised by misunderstandings and missteps by both sides. There are tensions between principles and interests, and between realpolitik and the pressures of democracy (on the Indian side). We will see the interplay between these aspects as we analyse the issue.

The root of the conflict

The root of the conflict is Tibet.

China's 1949 takeover of Tibet, which was hitherto a buffer state between India and China, suddenly created a border between the latter two countries. This is the border that then had to be negotiated.

The fundamental issue of principle is whether China had a right to annex Tibet in the first place. We can debate this endlessly based on history, and also based on whataboutism regarding India's 1973 annexation of Sikkim, another Himalayan kingdom. However, the real opposing point to principle here is realpolitik. Nobody today seriously disputes China's claim to Tibet. It is a part of the "One China" concept that all countries, including the US and India, have accepted.

Do we continue debating the annexation of Tibet by China on principle, or do we adopt an attitude of realpolitik and move on? (I would say move on.)

Ownership of Aksai Chin

Aksai Chin is a desolate and barren area of the Himalayas, cold, arid and unsuitable for agriculture, uninhabitable, and not known for any significant mineral resources. With the annexation of Tibet, however, Aksai Chin gained enormous strategic importance for China, because it provided the only access route into Tibet from China, specifically from China's Xinjiang province.

Since this was an area that was uninhabited and not actively patrolled by India, India remained unaware that China had started construction of a road in 1950 called the Karakoram Highway. China did it quietly and without fanfare. India only came to know about it in 1957, when a Chinese publication mentioned it publicly for the first time. Then all hell broke loose in India.

Given that Aksai Chin was a remote and inaccessible area, Jawaharlal Nehru was initially inclined to let Aksai Chin go, even arguing at one stage that "not a blade of grass grows there". However, he changed his mind when one of his advisors showed him documents establishing India's strong claim to the region.

From India's perspective, Aksai Chin was indisputably Indian territory, and there was no negotiation possible. It was an issue of principle. From China's perspective, it was a question of interests. The Karakoram Highway (and therefore Aksai Chin through which it passed) were of vital strategic importance, because there was no other way to access Tibet from China. Although China today has built other access routes into Tibet (including high-speed rail links) and thereby reduced its strategic dependence on the Karakoram highway, Aksai Chin was something China could not afford to give up back in those days. By analogy, the narrow Siliguri Corridor that connects India's northeastern states to the rest of India is a strategically important piece of territory. Even if another country (say Bangladesh) were to produce strong documentary evidence proving their claim to the Siliguri Corridor, India simply couldn't afford to give it up. That was China's situation in the 1950s and 1960s. India had the legal claim to Aksai Chin, but China could simply not afford to give it up.

Pedants would point out that the strategic importance of Aksai Chin to China was only because of the annexation of Tibet, which was itself questionable. However, if we accept the international consensus today that Tibet belongs to China, then it follows that China could not afford to give up Aksai Chin for reasons of national interest. Hence the tension between principle and national interest.

Negotiating positions

When China negotiated with India on Aksai Chin, India's position was unyielding for two reasons.

1. Nehru was recently convinced of India's legal claim to Aksai Chin, and therefore was indignant that China just moved into the area without even asking for permission or notifying India;
2. Even if Nehru had been willing to yield Aksai Chin to China after understanding China's crucial interest in it, the issue had by then become public knowledge in India. India's opposition parties, the press and public opinion together ensured that the Indian government could not yield on Aksai Chin.

We can see the tension between principle and national interest, and also between realpolitik and public pressure.

Bargaining chips

China realised that India was not going to budge on its claim to Aksai Chin, yet was unable to give up a vitally important piece of territory in view of its need to access Tibet.

I wonder if China could have offered to buy the territory from India. It might have been a fair way to settle the issue. Yet what China did in practice was introduce a new bargaining chip.

China did not have a strategic interest in territory to the east, but saw the opportunity to make a claim there to balance India's claim to Aksai Chin. China laid claim to the North East Frontier Area (NEFA), called Arunachal Pradesh today, on the grounds that it formed a contiguous part of Tibet. There was a plausible basis for the claim because the Tawang region of Arunachal Pradesh does in fact host monasteries that are an extension of a line of such monasteries in Tibet. China offered to relinquish its claim to NEFA if India would cede Aksai Chin.

The Indian government was understandably indignant about the new Chinese claim. It was clear that China, being unable to prove a superior legal claim to Aksai Chin, and faced with an India that was unwilling (or unable thanks to public pressure) to cede territory that was vitally important to China, was now staking a new claim just as a bargaining chip. Once again, we can see a tension between various elements. There's a matter of principle involved, because there is a justification for at least the Tawang area of Arunachal Pradesh to be reunited with the rest of Tibet, since the two are culturally contiguous. But then principle would also exhume the question of China's claim to Tibet itself. A third matter of principle is that one cannot accept a swap based on a new claim that was made with the transparent goal of balancing a valid claim by the other side. The opposing element of realpolitik says a swap between Aksai Chin (which India has a stronger claim to but China has a greater need for) and Arunachal/Tawang (which China/Tibet has a greater claim to but not a great need for) is a reasonable way forward. But then the indignation of the Indian government over this deliberately created bargaining chip, compounded by public pressure, meant that the swap could not be agreed to. As Nehru commented at the time, "If I agree to this deal, I will cease to be prime minister tomorrow".

The effect of time

China has been offering the "swap deal" (Aksai Chin for Arunachal Pradesh) on multiple occasions to several Indian governments, and has been rebuffed each time.

But over the years, as the power gap between India and China has widened in China's favour, realpolitik has begun to make India see that the swap deal was in fact a good idea to settle the border dispute for good, because India cannot afford to have an increasingly powerful adversary on its borders.

Unfortunately for India, it appears that that boat has sailed. In view of the growing power differential, the border tussle has now become one-sided in that China holds the initiative. China can keep India off-balance on the border, and India is forced into a reactive stance. The border dispute has now become a source of leverage for China over India. Every time India does something to displease China, China just has to "yank the chain" on the border to convey its displeasure. In this situation, settling the border dispute means China gives up that leverage. From China's perspective, why should it?

The new bargain

China now sees a settlement of the border dispute as a gift that it is giving India, because it means irreversibly relinquishing a source of leverage. Once the border is settled, China cannot make fresh territorial claims on India, which is a matter of great relief to India. However, there is no corresponding constraint on India's side. India can continue to engage in behaviour that displeases or threatens China, such as allying with China's enemies. Hence China needs something irreversible from India in exchange.

The basis for a bargain has therefore now altered. The swap is no longer the old one (Aksai Chin in exchange for Arunachal). The new swap is at a higher level (the border settlement itself in exchange for something irreversible from India).

The opportunity

The crisis in Ukraine has brought matters to a head. The rift between the West and Russia has become serious. China knows that its greatest threat is from the US-led West, and therefore it needs to align with Russia, but it lacks the leverage to do so openly, both because such open alignment violates its own stated policies, and because it is not immune to Western sanctions and related economic pressure.

India is in a similar bind. There are issues of national interest in supporting Russia. Yet there are dangers in doing so openly. And there is the further issue that India sees China as an adversary and the West as a necessary ally against China. The Russia-India-China triangle is complicated, with unresolved tensions. All three countries have an interest in seeing this tension resolved.

A possible solution

If India takes the initiative, it will need to accept the swap deal to settle the border dispute with China, and offer something irreversible in exchange. That something irreversible could be a package:

1. A similar settlement of the India-Pakistan border dispute, formalising the Line of Control (LOC) as the international border, making Pakistan-administered Kashmir no longer disputed territory, and hence removing India's opposition to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, which passes through Pakistan-administered Kashmir;
2. An agreement to withdraw from the Quad and other anti-China groupings;
3. An offer to link India's transport and port network to China's BRI to provide China better access to the Indian Ocean.

If China takes the initiative, it can make India an offer that it cannot refuse. The official Indian negotiating position is still that China needs to return Aksai Chin as well as relinquish its claim to Arunachal Pradesh. Realpolitik recognises that this is unlikely to happen, and a swap deal (Aksai Chin for Arunachal) is the best that India can hope for.

However, there is an opportunity here, because what the two countries need from Aksai Chin are different! India wants recognition of title. China wants operational control (perhaps less critically today than in the 1950s and 1960s). So a package from China could look like this:

1. China recognises Aksai Chin as part of India, on the condition that India leases it back to China for (say) 99 years. Indian public opinion can be assuaged by the fact that Aksai Chin has been returned (in terms of legal title), yet China retains operational control of the territory, which changes nothing on the ground. The financial terms of the lease may be pocket change for China.
2. China relinquishes its claim to Arunachal Pradesh. The Tawang region is possibly negotiable. India may not mind ceding the part of Arunachal Pradesh that is logically part of Tibet if it gets back its title to Aksai Chin as well as the rest of Arunachal.
3. India strongly aligns with Russia and China in terms of setting up an alternative to the US-controlled, dollarised global financial system.

Time is of the essence, because the global situation is changing from day to day. A quick resolution of issues between India and China can bring about an alignment of the most powerful non-Western countries, and a corresponding geopolitical balance.

[Check out my earlier posts on this topic:
1. "Quad Switch - How India Could Permanently Alter The Balance Of World Power (While Also Ensuring Its Own Best Interests)"
2. "How Indians Should Learn To Think About China"]

What The Ukraine Crisis Tells Us About The US

The long-simmering Ukrainian crisis has erupted into open conflict. What does this tell us about the US, though?

A map of the Ukraine showing the Crimean peninsula (seized by Russia in 2014) and the two breakaway provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk, where current fighting is concentrated

Let's look at three aspects of US behaviour leading up to this crisis.

1. The promise not to expand NATO

When the Soviet Union was collapsing, the US assured Gorbachev (both on its own and through Germany) that it would not seek to expand the borders of NATO eastwards.

We know what actually happened. The inclusion of East Germany into NATO as a result of German reunification was understandable, but then the following countries became NATO members too, and NATO's missiles moved closer and closer to Russia.

1. Czech Republic (1999), formerly part of the Warsaw Pact as Czechoslovakia
2. Hungary (1999), formerly part of the Warsaw Pact
3. Poland (1999), formerly part of the Warsaw Pact
4. Bulgaria (2004), formerly part of the Warsaw Pact
5. Estonia (2004), formerly part of the Soviet Union itself
6. Latvia (2004), formerly part of the Soviet Union itself
7. Lithuania (2004), formerly part of the Soviet Union itself
8. Romania (2004), formerly part of the Warsaw Pact
9. Slovakia (2004), formerly part of the Warsaw Pact as Czechoslovakia
10. Slovenia (2004), formerly part of neutral Yugolavia
11. Albania (2009), formerly part of the Warsaw Pact
12. Croatia (2009), formerly part of neutral Yugolavia
13. Montenegro (2017), formerly part of neutral Yugolavia
14. Macedonia (2020), formerly part of neutral Yugolavia

It's clear that the US adopted a winner-takes-all mentality against Russia, much like what the victors of World War I did to Germany through the Treaty of Versailles. We know how Germany reacted as a result of that oppressive treaty, so should Russia's reaction today be any surprise?

2. The support for democratic values

The US has always claimed to stand for democratic values against authoritarian regimes like Russia's.

But what actually happened in the Ukraine? There was a democratic election held in 2010, when Viktor Yanukovych defeated incumbent prime minister Yulia Tymoshenko in the race for president. Yanokovych's government therefore had legitimacy as a democratically elected one. However, Yanukovych's government was pro-Russia. In 2014, there were protests in Ukraine over the tilt towards Russia and away from Europe, and Yanukovych's elected government was deposed in a coup (not through an election) and replaced by one headed by Arseniy Yatsenyuk. This new government promptly signed an agreement with the EU.

Nobody knows if the protests against the Yanukovych government that culminated in his ouster were a genuine grassroots uprising or were engineered from outside, although one can hazard a guess.

In any case, it's clear that the US doesn't mind the ouster of a democratically elected government through a coup, as long as the change favours its own interests.

3. The promise of support against aggression

A lot of noise has been made by the US over the past few months over the imminent Russian invasion of the Ukraine, and the Ukrainian people were promised support against Russian aggression.

But what actually happened? In recent weeks, the US as well as its key European allies have ruled out sending troops to fight any invading Russian army, and have only threatened economic sanctions and support to Ukrainian insurgents. Once the invasion began, President Biden said that "the prayers of the entire world are with Ukraine".

It's clear that the US goads its vassal states into brinkmanship, but when the chips are down, they only send "thoughts and prayers". Not the most reliable ally. They deserted the Hmong in Vietnam, and they deserted their interpreters in Afghanistan. (Something for India to keep in mind as it takes on China with the imagined backing of the US.)

What the Ukraine crisis teaches us about the US

1. They're liars. Never believe them when they promise you something.

2. They're hypocrites. They do the opposite of what they claim to stand for.

3. They're impotent cowards. If you wade into battle on their behalf expecting them to back you up, good luck.

When The New York Times Proved To Be No Better Than Pravda

There was an old American joke I read long ago about the former Soviet Union, and it went like this:

There was a race somewhere between an American car and a Russian car, and the American car won. (Of course the American car won! This is an American joke, remember?)

The next day's headlines in Pravda said, "The Russian car came second, while the American car was next to last."

Ha, ha! Oh, those Russians!

I've been watching the medal tally at the Tokyo Olympics over the last couple of weeks, and something puzzled me about American reporting on this.

Normally, medal tallies are shown in descending order of gold, then silver, and then bronze medals. The country with the most golds is on top. If two countries have the same number of golds, then the one with more silvers goes above the other. Ditto if the two countries have the same number of golds and silvers. The country with more bronze medals goes above the other.

Not according to the New York Times, though.

In their reporting, the medal tally was sorted in descending order of total number of medals.

But wait, there's more!

One would think there would be no wiggle room when comparing gold medals, right?

Apparently, there is. You can shrink the icons on China's row to make it look much shorter than it is. That way, the US won't look quite so bad.

Unbelievable, right? I guess that's what a "free press" means. You're free to bend and twist the truth in any way you like. Not that it didn't get called out and ridiculed on Twitter and Reddit. In that context, I learnt a new word - copium.

Luckily for them, the US ended the Olympics with more gold medals than China (in addition to having more medals overall), so it could legitimately be at the top of the medal tally, and the media subterfuge of the previous few days went by unremarked.

Now you know why I don't believe the Western press when it comes to reporting on China. If they can distort such obvious facts to create a misleading impression, what else are they distorting?