A Creative Solution To The India-China Border Row

I've read a great deal about the roots of the India-China border conflict - quite a few online articles, and three books in particular.

1. India After Gandhi, by Ramachandra Guha
2. India versus China (Why They Are Not Friends), by Kanti Bajpai
3. Powershift, by Zorawar Daulet Singh

Another important book is "India's China War" by Neville Maxwell, which is based on the yet-unreleased Henderson-Brooks Report (HBR). I have read excerpts of this book.

In a nutshell, the situation is complex, nuanced and characterised by misunderstandings and missteps by both sides. There are tensions between principles and interests, and between realpolitik and the pressures of democracy (on the Indian side). We will see the interplay between these aspects as we analyse the issue.

The root of the conflict

The root of the conflict is Tibet.

China's 1949 takeover of Tibet, which was hitherto a buffer state between India and China, suddenly created a border between the latter two countries. This is the border that then had to be negotiated.

The fundamental issue of principle is whether China had a right to annex Tibet in the first place. We can debate this endlessly based on history, and also based on whataboutism regarding India's 1973 annexation of Sikkim, another Himalayan kingdom. However, the real opposing point to principle here is realpolitik. Nobody today seriously disputes China's claim to Tibet. It is a part of the "One China" concept that all countries, including the US and India, have accepted.

Do we continue debating the annexation of Tibet by China on principle, or do we adopt an attitude of realpolitik and move on? (I would say move on.)

Ownership of Aksai Chin

Aksai Chin is a desolate and barren area of the Himalayas, cold, arid and unsuitable for agriculture, uninhabitable, and not known for any significant mineral resources. With the annexation of Tibet, however, Aksai Chin gained enormous strategic importance for China, because it provided the only access route into Tibet from China, specifically from China's Xinjiang province.

Since this was an area that was uninhabited and not actively patrolled by India, India remained unaware that China had started construction of a road in 1950 called the Karakoram Highway. China did it quietly and without fanfare. India only came to know about it in 1957, when a Chinese publication mentioned it publicly for the first time. Then all hell broke loose in India.

Given that Aksai Chin was a remote and inaccessible area, Jawaharlal Nehru was initially inclined to let Aksai Chin go, even arguing at one stage that "not a blade of grass grows there". However, he changed his mind when one of his advisors showed him documents establishing India's strong claim to the region.

From India's perspective, Aksai Chin was indisputably Indian territory, and there was no negotiation possible. It was an issue of principle. From China's perspective, it was a question of interests. The Karakoram Highway (and therefore Aksai Chin through which it passed) were of vital strategic importance, because there was no other way to access Tibet from China. Although China today has built other access routes into Tibet (including high-speed rail links) and thereby reduced its strategic dependence on the Karakoram highway, Aksai Chin was something China could not afford to give up back in those days. By analogy, the narrow Siliguri Corridor that connects India's northeastern states to the rest of India is a strategically important piece of territory. Even if another country (say Bangladesh) were to produce strong documentary evidence proving their claim to the Siliguri Corridor, India simply couldn't afford to give it up. That was China's situation in the 1950s and 1960s. India had the legal claim to Aksai Chin, but China could simply not afford to give it up.

Pedants would point out that the strategic importance of Aksai Chin to China was only because of the annexation of Tibet, which was itself questionable. However, if we accept the international consensus today that Tibet belongs to China, then it follows that China could not afford to give up Aksai Chin for reasons of national interest. Hence the tension between principle and national interest.

Negotiating positions

When China negotiated with India on Aksai Chin, India's position was unyielding for two reasons.

1. Nehru was recently convinced of India's legal claim to Aksai Chin, and therefore was indignant that China just moved into the area without even asking for permission or notifying India;
2. Even if Nehru had been willing to yield Aksai Chin to China after understanding China's crucial interest in it, the issue had by then become public knowledge in India. India's opposition parties, the press and public opinion together ensured that the Indian government could not yield on Aksai Chin.

We can see the tension between principle and national interest, and also between realpolitik and public pressure.

Bargaining chips

China realised that India was not going to budge on its claim to Aksai Chin, yet was unable to give up a vitally important piece of territory in view of its need to access Tibet.

I wonder if China could have offered to buy the territory from India. It might have been a fair way to settle the issue. Yet what China did in practice was introduce a new bargaining chip.

China did not have a strategic interest in territory to the east, but saw the opportunity to make a claim there to balance India's claim to Aksai Chin. China laid claim to the North East Frontier Area (NEFA), called Arunachal Pradesh today, on the grounds that it formed a contiguous part of Tibet. There was a plausible basis for the claim because the Tawang region of Arunachal Pradesh does in fact host monasteries that are an extension of a line of such monasteries in Tibet. China offered to relinquish its claim to NEFA if India would cede Aksai Chin.

The Indian government was understandably indignant about the new Chinese claim. It was clear that China, being unable to prove a superior legal claim to Aksai Chin, and faced with an India that was unwilling (or unable thanks to public pressure) to cede territory that was vitally important to China, was now staking a new claim just as a bargaining chip. Once again, we can see a tension between various elements. There's a matter of principle involved, because there is a justification for at least the Tawang area of Arunachal Pradesh to be reunited with the rest of Tibet, since the two are culturally contiguous. But then principle would also exhume the question of China's claim to Tibet itself. A third matter of principle is that one cannot accept a swap based on a new claim that was made with the transparent goal of balancing a valid claim by the other side. The opposing element of realpolitik says a swap between Aksai Chin (which India has a stronger claim to but China has a greater need for) and Arunachal/Tawang (which China/Tibet has a greater claim to but not a great need for) is a reasonable way forward. But then the indignation of the Indian government over this deliberately created bargaining chip, compounded by public pressure, meant that the swap could not be agreed to. As Nehru commented at the time, "If I agree to this deal, I will cease to be prime minister tomorrow".

The effect of time

China has been offering the "swap deal" (Aksai Chin for Arunachal Pradesh) on multiple occasions to several Indian governments, and has been rebuffed each time.

But over the years, as the power gap between India and China has widened in China's favour, realpolitik has begun to make India see that the swap deal was in fact a good idea to settle the border dispute for good, because India cannot afford to have an increasingly powerful adversary on its borders.

Unfortunately for India, it appears that that boat has sailed. In view of the growing power differential, the border tussle has now become one-sided in that China holds the initiative. China can keep India off-balance on the border, and India is forced into a reactive stance. The border dispute has now become a source of leverage for China over India. Every time India does something to displease China, China just has to "yank the chain" on the border to convey its displeasure. In this situation, settling the border dispute means China gives up that leverage. From China's perspective, why should it?

The new bargain

China now sees a settlement of the border dispute as a gift that it is giving India, because it means irreversibly relinquishing a source of leverage. Once the border is settled, China cannot make fresh territorial claims on India, which is a matter of great relief to India. However, there is no corresponding constraint on India's side. India can continue to engage in behaviour that displeases or threatens China, such as allying with China's enemies. Hence China needs something irreversible from India in exchange.

The basis for a bargain has therefore now altered. The swap is no longer the old one (Aksai Chin in exchange for Arunachal). The new swap is at a higher level (the border settlement itself in exchange for something irreversible from India).

The opportunity

The crisis in Ukraine has brought matters to a head. The rift between the West and Russia has become serious. China knows that its greatest threat is from the US-led West, and therefore it needs to align with Russia, but it lacks the leverage to do so openly, both because such open alignment violates its own stated policies, and because it is not immune to Western sanctions and related economic pressure.

India is in a similar bind. There are issues of national interest in supporting Russia. Yet there are dangers in doing so openly. And there is the further issue that India sees China as an adversary and the West as a necessary ally against China. The Russia-India-China triangle is complicated, with unresolved tensions. All three countries have an interest in seeing this tension resolved.

A possible solution

If India takes the initiative, it will need to accept the swap deal to settle the border dispute with China, and offer something irreversible in exchange. That something irreversible could be a package:

1. A similar settlement of the India-Pakistan border dispute, formalising the Line of Control (LOC) as the international border, making Pakistan-administered Kashmir no longer disputed territory, and hence removing India's opposition to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, which passes through Pakistan-administered Kashmir;
2. An agreement to withdraw from the Quad and other anti-China groupings;
3. An offer to link India's transport and port network to China's BRI to provide China better access to the Indian Ocean.

If China takes the initiative, it can make India an offer that it cannot refuse. The official Indian negotiating position is still that China needs to return Aksai Chin as well as relinquish its claim to Arunachal Pradesh. Realpolitik recognises that this is unlikely to happen, and a swap deal (Aksai Chin for Arunachal) is the best that India can hope for.

However, there is an opportunity here, because what the two countries need from Aksai Chin are different! India wants recognition of title. China wants operational control (perhaps less critically today than in the 1950s and 1960s). So a package from China could look like this:

1. China recognises Aksai Chin as part of India, on the condition that India leases it back to China for (say) 99 years. Indian public opinion can be assuaged by the fact that Aksai Chin has been returned (in terms of legal title), yet China retains operational control of the territory, which changes nothing on the ground. The financial terms of the lease may be pocket change for China.
2. China relinquishes its claim to Arunachal Pradesh. The Tawang region is possibly negotiable. India may not mind ceding the part of Arunachal Pradesh that is logically part of Tibet if it gets back its title to Aksai Chin as well as the rest of Arunachal.
3. India strongly aligns with Russia and China in terms of setting up an alternative to the US-controlled, dollarised global financial system.

Time is of the essence, because the global situation is changing from day to day. A quick resolution of issues between India and China can bring about an alignment of the most powerful non-Western countries, and a corresponding geopolitical balance.

[Check out my earlier posts on this topic:
1. "Quad Switch - How India Could Permanently Alter The Balance Of World Power (While Also Ensuring Its Own Best Interests)"
2. "How Indians Should Learn To Think About China"]